Delayed Authoritarian Consolidation in Cuba and Mongolia

Abstract

Abstract Cuba and Mongolia experienced delayed authoritarian consolidation due to their low party scope and limited aid in the initial post-takeover period. Fidel Castro came to power without the help of a communist party and intentionally kept party institutions weak to preserve his personalist power. The Mongolian communist party’s origins in exile left it with a limited membership comprising largely traditional elites. Soviet technical aid and authoritarian practices—such as systemic purges—increased party scope, particularly in Mongolia. Entrance into the CMEA (Comecon) initiated a massive wave of Soviet aid in both states that led to the development of larger state sectors and an expansive social welfare system. Cuba’s personalist leader, Castro, rebelled against the planning sector after it constrained his power. By contrast, Mongolia’s personalist leader, Tsedenbal, did not, precisely because, as a former planner, the planning sector was a key part of his authoritarian coalition.

Key findings

• ▸Low party scope and limited aid contributed to delayed authoritarian consolidation
• ▸Soviet technical aid and practices increased party scope, particularly in Mongolia
• ▸Personalist leaders' relationships with the planning sector influenced authoritarian consolidation

Keywords

Identifiers

DOI

10.1093/9780198994602.003.0008

Journal

The Enduring Power of Communism

Year

2026